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Abstract—Humans use signs, e.g., sentences in a spoken lan-
guage, for communication and thought. Hence, symbol systems
like language are crucial for our communication with other
agents and adaptation to our real-world environment. The symbol
systems we use in our human society adaptively and dynamically
change over time. In the context of artificial intelligence (AI)
and cognitive systems, the symbol grounding problem has been
regarded as one of the central problems related to symbols.
However, the symbol grounding problem was originally posed
to connect symbolic AI and sensorimotor information and did
not consider many interdisciplinary phenomena in human com-
munication and dynamic symbol systems in our society, which
semiotics considered. In this paper, we focus on the symbol
emergence problem, addressing not only cognitive dynamics but
also the dynamics of symbol systems in society, rather than the
symbol grounding problem. We first introduce the notion of a
symbol in semiotics from the humanities, to leave the very narrow
idea of symbols in symbolic AI. Furthermore, over the years,
it became more and more clear that symbol emergence has to
be regarded as a multifaceted problem. Therefore, secondly, we
review the history of the symbol emergence problem in different
fields, including both biological and artificial systems, showing
their mutual relations. We summarize the discussion and provide
an integrative viewpoint and comprehensive overview of symbol
emergence in cognitive systems. Additionally, we describe the
challenges facing the creation of cognitive systems that can be
part of symbol emergence systems.
Index Terms—Symbol emergence, developmental robotics, ar-
tificial intelligence, symbol grounding, language acquisition
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Fig. 1. Robot in a home environment that has to deal with complex
manipulation, planning, and interaction via semiotic communication with
human users.
I. INTRODUCTION
SYMBOLS, such as language, are used externally andinternally when we communicate with others, including
cognitive robots, or think about something. Gaining the ability
to use symbol systems, which include not only natural lan-
guage but also gestures, traffic signs, and other culturally or
habitually determined signs, in a bottom-up manner is crucial
for future cognitive robots to communicate and collaborate
with people. Because symbols in the human society are not
given by a designer but instead they emerge and dynamically
evolve through social interaction, the problem of symbol
emergence in cognitive and developmental systems is central
to advance the state of the art of intelligent human-machine
interaction.
Figure 1 depicts a human–robot interaction scenario. Here,
a robot is handing over a cup following the utterance of
the command “give me the cup” by the person. A string
of letters (written or spoken) has to be translated into a
series of motor actions by the robot, with reference to the
context and the environment. This may appear to be a simple
task. However, to achieve this in a developmental manner,
the machine has to learn to deal with complex manipulation,
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2planning, and interaction via natural semiotic communication,
i.e., communication using symbols, with the human. Addition-
ally, semiotic communication in the real-world environment
usually relies on mutual beliefs, shared knowledge, and context
between the speaker and listener to resolve uncertainties in the
communication and environment. Ultimately, this amounts to
providing the robot with a set of mechanisms for developing
a complex cognitive system. The mechanisms should allow
the robot to learn representations and symbols for semiotic
communication. Thus, we require powerful machine-learning
methods that emulate appropriate models of the cognitive
development of this human trait. Such a set of methods must
start with a hierarchical decomposition of spatiotemporal and
sensorimotor data fusing multimodal information. The main
challenge is then the autonomous generation of a wide range
of grounded concepts that are internally represented with
different levels of abstraction. This will allow the agent to
make inferences across different complexity levels, thereby
allowing it to understand this type of human request.
In addition to learning or internalizing the pre-existing
meaning and usage of signs, we humans can also invent
and generate signs to represent things in our daily life.
This immediately suggests that symbol systems are not static
systems in our society, but rather dynamic systems, owing
to the semiotic adaptiveness and creativity of our cognition.
However, current robots still do not have sufficient symbol
system learning capabilities to become able to communicate
with human users or to adapt to the real-world environment
in a developmental manner.
With respect to the term “symbol”, many scholars still have
significant confusion about its meaning. They tend to confuse
symbols in symbolic AI with symbols in human society. When
we talk about symbol emergence, we refer to the latter case.
Note that this paper is not about symbolic AI, but rather
focuses on the question of how we can develop cognitive
systems that can learn and use symbol systems in our society.
The symbol grounding problem was proposed by Har-
nad [1]. Their paper started with symbolic AI. Symbolic AI
is a design philosophy of AI based on the bold physical
symbol system hypothesis proposed by Newell [2], [3] (see
Section IV-A), which has already been rejected practically, at
least in the context of creating cognitive systems in the real-
world environment. The term “symbol” in symbolic AI is his-
torically rooted in symbolic/mathematical logic. It is originally
different from the symbols in our daily life. The motivation of
Harnad’s study was to determine how to connect symbolic AI
and sensorimotor information to overcome the problem that
such symbols, i.e., tokens, have no connections with our real-
world phenomena without grounding. Since that paper was
published, many scholars have presented broad interpretations
of the symbol grounding problem, and the problem definition
has become more and more popular. However, because the
discussion of the symbol grounding problem started with a
questionable assumption, i.e., using symbolic AI, the problem
formulation of the symbol grounding problem has several
drawbacks.
First, it is therein assumed that symbols are physical tokens
and considered that symbols in communication (e.g., words),
and tokens in ones mind, (i.e., internal representations) are
the same. This comes from the physical symbol system
hypothesis, which we now need to say is simply wrong. It is
fair to assume that our brain does not contain such strictly
discrete internal representations. Instead, it is more likely
that there exist more probabilistic, continuous, and distributed
representations, e.g., activation patterns in neural networks and
probability distributions in probabilistic models, which lead to
computational requirements different from those in (classical)
AI. Second, their classical paper did not consider the social
dynamics and diversity of symbol systems, which are crucial in
semiotics. In other words, the meaning of a symbol can change
over time and between different communities and contexts.
Meanwhile, we still have challenges in making artificial
cognitive systems that can learn and understand the meaning
of symbols, e.g., language. However, most studies, tackling
the challenges in developing cognitive systems that can learn
language and adaptive behaviors in the real-world environ-
ment, rarely use symbolic AI nowadays. Cognitive systems
do not have to have pre-existing symbol systems for their
cognition. Instead, an agent ought to learn a symbol system,
e.g., language, by interacting with others and its environ-
ment, and even invent new symbols and share them with the
community it joins. Therefore, naturally, symbol grounding
problem is, under this viewpoint, replaced with the symbol
emergence problem. Symbol emergence has been suggested
as a critical concept for understanding and creating cognitive
developmental systems that are capable of behaving adaptively
in the real world and that can communicate with people [4],
[5].
Thus, the symbol emergence problem is indeed a multi-
faceted problem that should take different sources of infor-
mation for learning into account. The required computational
models should enable the simultaneous learning of action
primitives together with the syntax of object manipulations,
complemented by lexicographic, syntactic, and ontologic lan-
guage information learned from speech signals. To scale up
to real-world problems, the required architecture needs to
integrate these aspects using general, not specifically tailored,
mechanisms that provide an overarching framework for cog-
nitive development.
Thus, in this paper, we address the interdisciplinary prob-
lem history of symbols and symbol emergence in cognitive
developmental systems discussed in different fields and also
point out their mutual relations1. We describe recent work and
approaches to solve this problem, and provide a discussion of
the definitions and relations among related notions, such as
concept, category, feature representation, and symbol. These
terms have often been used interchangeably in different theo-
ries and fields to refer to similar phenomena. This paper aims
to provide a comprehensive survey of studies related to symbol
emergence in cognitive developmental systems [6], as well
1This paper is based on a one-week workshop, the Shonan
meeting on Cognitive Development and Symbol Emergence in
Humans and Robots (http://shonan.nii.ac.jp/shonan/blog/2015/10/31/
cognitive-development-and-symbol-emergence-in-humans-and-robots/). This
meeting focused on a constructive approach toward language acquisition,
symbol emergence, and cognitive development in autonomous systems,
discussing these from highly interdisciplinary perspectives.
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Fig. 2. Definition of a symbol in semiotics. The triadic relationship between
the sign, object, and interpretant is regarded as a symbol. In a static case,
it tends to be regarded as a dyadic relationship between the reference and
referent. Note that in general, the interpretation of signs also depends on the
context.
as an integrative viewpoint on symbol emergence describing
potential future challenges.
Section II introduces the aspect of semiotics. Sections III
and IV describe the problem history in related fields con-
cerning biological systems (i.e., mainly humans) and artifi-
cial systems, respectively. Section V provides an integrative
viewpoint that is consistent with the notion of symbols in the
different fields. Section VI describes the challenges in this type
of research, and Section VII offers some conclusions.
II. SEMIOTICS: FROM SIGNS TO SYMBOLS
Symbol is not only a term in AI and cognitive robotics, but
is also frequently used in our human society. The nature of
the symbols that humans use in their daily life is studied in
semiotics, which is the study of signs that mediate the process
of meaning formation and allow for meaningful communica-
tion between people. This is a highly interdisciplinary research
field related to linguistics, cultural studies, arts, and biology.
Peirce and Saussure are considered as independent founders
of this field [7].
Endowing robots with the capability to understand and deal
with symbols in human society (e.g., Fig. 1) requires a robot to
learn to use symbol systems that we humans use in our society.
Symbols are formed, updated, and modulated by humans to
communicate and collaborate with each other in our daily life.
Therefore, any definition of symbol that only holds for artificial
systems is insufficient to allow for human–robot interaction.
To achieve this, we can adopt the definition of symbol
given by Peircean semiotics and represented by a semiotic
triad (Fig. 2). Peircean semiotics considers a symbol as a
process called semiosis. Semiosis has three elements, i.e.,
sign (representamen), object, and interpretant. The triadic
relationship is illustrated in Fig. 2. Sign describes the form
that the symbol takes, e.g., signals, utterances, images, facial
expressions, etc. Object refers to something that the sign
represents. Interpretant (rather than interpreter) is the effect
of a sign on a person who perceives the sign. In other words,
the interpretant is the process that relates the sign with object.
Naively, people tend to think there is a fixed relationship
between a sign and its object. In our natural communication
and social life, the meaning of signs hugely depends on
contexts, participants, communities, cultures, and languages.
It is the third term—interpretant—which gives our semiotic
communication a very high degree of diversity. A symbol
is not a static entity, but rather a dynamic process involving
active interpretation. The dynamic inference process is named
semiosis in Peircean semiotics [8]. Thus, the meaning that
a sign conveys to a person can change depending on its
interpretant.
In this paper, we employ this definition of symbol because
our target is semiotic communication not symbolic AI. Note
that signs do not have to be speech signals or written letters.
Any type of stimulus, i.e. any signal, could become a sign in
a symbol.
By contrast, Saussurian semiotics2 places more emphasis
on a systematic perspective of symbols as opposed to the
individual dynamics of a symbol. This model assumes that
symbol consists of sign (signifier) and referent (signified)
leading to a dyadic structure. This view is similar to the view
of symbolic AI. In symbolic AI, to determine the meaning,
more emphasis is placed on symbol–symbol relations.
Common to both—Peircean and Saussurian semiotics—is
the fact that sign and object are heavily intertwined. A sign
that is not linked to objects or events directly or indirectly is
essentially meaningless [1]. Only when we perceive the sign
of a symbol, can we infer which object the sign represents.
Furthermore, it should be noted that a symbol generates a
boundary between the “signified” (object) and anything else.
Therefore, symbol systems introduce discrete structures into
the world.
The supporters of both models also insist that the re-
lationship between sign and referent (object) is arbitrary.
Arbitrariness does not indicate randomness or disorder. Rather,
it means that symbol systems defining relationships between
signs and referents can be different from each other, depending
on languages, cultures, communities, and generations. This is
an important aspect of symbol systems in our human society.
Scholars who may be familiar with symbolic AI may argue
that the advantage of symbolic AI is that one can manipulate
symbols independently of the substrate on which they are
grounded. Arguably, this has been regarded as the central,
major strength that makes symbol systems so useful. As
remarked by Harnad [1], a symbol is a part of a symbol system,
i.e., the notion of a symbol in isolation is not a useful one.
The question about symbol manipulation has also led to a
vigorous debate between the Cartesian view (mind without
body) of symbolic AI as compared to the view presented by
embodied cognition, which posits that the mind without the
body is impossible [9]–[11].
Numerous studies in semiotics, including cultural studies,
provided a deeper understanding of symbol systems. However,
so far there is no computational model that can reproduce the
2Saussurian semiotics is often called semiology as well.
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Fig. 3. Pyramid of cognitive complexity leading upward from basic motor
control to symbolic representations.
dynamics of semiosis in the real world. In addition, most of
the studies in semiotics focused on existing symbol systems
and rarely considered the developmental process and emergent
properties of symbol systems. Presuming the definition of
symbols in semiotics, rather than starting with symbolic AI,
we would like to integrate interdisciplinary views of symbol
systems, and set out an integrative common foundation called
the symbol emergence system.
III. PROBLEM HISTORY 1: SYMBOL EMERGENCE IN
BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS
A. Evolutionary viewpoint: from actions to symbols
From an evolutionary viewpoint, symbol emergence should
also be explained in the context of adaptation to the envi-
ronment. With few exceptions, and different from plants,
all animals are able to move. Considering the phylogeny of
the animal kingdom, movement patterns, actions, and action
sequences have become more and more complex. In parallel to
this development, more complex cognitive traits have emerged
over 2–3 billion years from protozoa to humans, too. Actions,
action sequences, and action planning have been discussed as
structures highly similar to grammar [12], [13]. For example,
Aloimonos et al. and Lee et al. have developed a context-free
action grammar to describe human manipulations [14], [15].
We would now argue that action and action understanding
come before symbolization, and that the grammatical structure
implicit to action lends itself as a natural scaffold to the latter.
The vast majority of all animals perform their movements
almost exclusively in a reactive, reflex-like manner, responding
to stimuli from the environment. This leads to a repertoire of
various movement patterns, which we could consider as the
basic syntactic elements in a grammar of actions. Chaining
such actions leads to action sequences. A jellyfish can do
this: on touching, poisonous microharpoons are triggered in
its tentacles, after which the victim is hauled in and finally
devoured. Remarkably, such an action chain has deep seman-
tics (meaning) in terms of survival for the jellyfish; still, we
would think it is fair to assume that it has no inkling about
its own actions. Notably, evolution has built many highly
“programmed” and reactive systems (e.g., spiders) that can
chain actions in very complex ways (e.g. building their net).
Semantics, while present, nevertheless remain fully implicit to
all of those.
The making-explicit of action semantics does not come
easily, and action understanding is not a one-shot process
that suddenly appeared in evolution. Potentially, all those
animals that can purposefully “make things happen” achieve
first steps along this path. In other words, a creature that is
able to prepare the grounds for a successful action by making
sure that all necessary action preconditions exist has already
gained some action understanding. This creature would not
yet be able to reason about its actions, but it can purposefully
repeat them. The more flexibility such a creature shows in
being able to perform an action under different and variable
situations, the higher we would deem its cognitive standing.
Somewhere, our imagined animal has begun to understand the
cause–effect relations that underlie its actions. Correlation-
based learning, possibly paired with imitation learning, can
underlie the formation of this type of action understanding
in these animals3. The fact that this type of learning is only
associative and not inferential (as discussed in comparative
psychology [16], [17]) may be less relevant to our practical
stance: if I can purposefully make it happen, I have understood
it.
Repetitions of the same or a similar action in different
situations, and hence of different action variants in an action
class, can make it possible to extract action pre- as well
as post-conditions, the cause and effect structure, or in one
word: the essence of this action class. This requires memory
as well as generalization processes that allow commonalities
from individual examples to be extracted. In the regime of
machine learning, clustering mechanisms across individual
instantiations of action-triggered cause–effect pairs could pos-
sibly serve this purpose. For humans and a few “higher”
animals, something similar is happening and—if successful—
one could say that this animal/human has formed a concept of
the action. The term concept refers here to an overarching
structure because it subsumes all essential pre-conditions,
action variants, and action outcomes (post-conditions) into
one conjoint representation, omitting all aspects that are noisy
and/or contingent. This process also leads to the fact that
concepts are discrete, making them distinguishable from each
other.
Symbols are at the far end of a whole chain of complex
processes, and many animals can perform earlier steps in this
chain but not later ones, making them “less cognitive” than
humans. What do we have in mind here? Figure 3 depicts a
possible pyramid that leads from simple, clearly noncognitive
processes step by step upward to complex, symbol-supported
(language-supported) cognition. Essentially, we posit that such
a chain moves from a combination of motion elements via
semantic motion primitives to the formation of concepts where
signs are attached (created) only at the very end.
Whereas action may have been the origin for triggering
concept formation, by now we—humans—have surpassed this
3Here, supervised learning plays a major role for humans, also found in
great apes to a lesser degree.
5stage and have taken concept formation into different and
sometimes highly abstract domains.
We would argue that the formation of such discrete concepts
is central to the emergence of symbols and that the level of
concepts is the one where symbolization can set in. The term
Object in Fig. 2 indeed takes the wider meaning of concept
of object (-class).
In particular, one can now see that attaching a sign to a
concept is simple. You could use anything. Is this all and are
we done now?
We believe the remaining difficulty lies in the communi-
cation process. Symbols (based on signs) are initially only
meaningful in a communication process. This may have started
as one-step memos of an individual, such as the drawing of a
wiggly line on the ground to remind your stone-age self to go
to the river as suggested by Dennett [18]. This may have led to
more complex silent discourse with yourself and in parallel to
true inter-individual communication. It is indeed totally trivial
to attach a sign, say a string of letters, to a concept (once the
latter exists), but to understand my uttering of this string, my
listener and I need to share the same or at least a very similar
concept of the referred-to entity. Thus, we would argue that
the forming of a concept is a difficult problem and so is the
negotiation process for the sharing of a symbol (where the
actual shape of the sign does not matter).
Now, it also becomes clearer why humans and some nonhu-
man primates can handle symbols4: These genera are highly
social and continuously engage in inter-individual exchanges;
they communicate. Wolves do this, too. Why did they not
begin to develop symbolic thinking? We believe this is where
the grammatical aspect of action comes in. Action chains lend
themselves to planning and reasoning about them but only
if these chains are performed in a highly reliable way, for
example by the hands of monkeys (humans). Wolves cannot
do this. They cannot reliably chain (manipulate) actions. The
reliable repeatability of action chains may first lead to planning
and, second, to explicit symbolization, which would be the
next step.
While suggestive, it necessarily remains unclear whether or
not evolution indeed followed this path. We are here, however,
centrally concerned not with this but rather with artificial
cognitive developmental systems, asking how they could learn
to use symbols. The above discussion posits that this could
possibly be best understood by tackling the concept formation
and symbol negotiation problem.
B. Neuroscientific viewpoint: from neural representations to
symbols
Humans use symbols. On the one hand, it is known that
all the representations in the brain are highly dynamic and
distributed, and thus only a snapshot of the brain’s activity
and state could come close to what we may call a symbol
in symbolic AI. Such a fine-grained view would, however, be
useless as it completely spoils the utility of symbol systems
that compactly represent concepts (things, ideas, movement
4Bonobos can handle but not create symbols. The latter has, at best, been
reported by anecdotal observations.
patterns, etc.). On the other hand, we could hope to find local
neural representations that stand for abstractions of percepts,
events, motor plans, etc., which could thus be considered
concepts of the brain.
This view critically assumes that concept-like internal rep-
resentations in the brain must have emerged before expressed
symbols for social communication. The initial evolutionary
pressure for their formation was not social communication
but rather for internal computation and communication in
the brain. There are intriguing examples of such localized
neural representations that may play the role of a concept;
however, whether these symbol- or concept-representations are
manipulated for inference and planning is largely unknown.
A good candidate for the representation of action concepts
is the neural response exhibited by mirror neurons. These
neurons were initially discovered in the ventral premotor
cortex of macaque monkeys (area F5), and evidence exists
that humans are also endowed with a mirror system [19].
Macaque mirror neurons become activated when a monkey
executes a grasp action, as well as when the monkey observes
another monkey or human perform a similar action [20]–[22].
This duality lends support to the plausibility of the idea that
a mirror neuron activity represents an abstraction of an action
for further processing, as opposed to being an intermediate
representation of action production. If the former is indeed
correct, then mirror neurons should be considered as encoding
concepts or symbols for actions, regardless whether they are
executed or observed.
In general, the minute details of an action are not critical
for most of the mirror neurons [23]; therefore, their activity
is probably not a precise motor code. Initial reports on mirror
neurons focused on their role for action understanding; but
later, higher-level functions have also been attributed to them,
such as understanding the intention of the observed actions
(e.g., grasping for eating vs. grasping for placing) [24].
It would be very valuable to decipher how mirror neuron
activity is used elsewhere in the brain. If it were used as the
basis for planning, we could happily claim that some sort of
concept representation is undertaken by these neurons. In this
case, we may feel comfortable calling the mirror activity a
neural symbol of an action.
Human brain imaging studies suggest that significant con-
ceptual binding of objects, events, actions, feelings etc. exists
in different mirror systems. For example, feeling disgust and
seeing someone disgusted activates overlapping regions in the
brain [25]. This is also the case for pain [26]. It would,
therefore, be possible to claim that these overlapping areas
represent the concept of pain, and the neural (population)
activity pattern there could be considered as the neural symbol
representation for pain. Opposing this view, however, is that
these are gross symbols that lack manipulability, and thus
cannot really fulfill the role of symbol as defined above. From
an evolutionary viewpoint such a neural system prepares the
ground for symbol/concept externalization, and the start of
language when combined with the recursive structure of action
planning and imitation as elaborated in Arbib’s language
evolution theory [27]–[29]. Instead of the evolution of a syntax
processing enabled brain related to speech production, Arbib
6argues that the neurons for manual actions have evolved into
mirror systems for imitation and simple manual communica-
tion, which facilitated the biological evolution of the human
language-ready brain that can sustain a protolanguage [28],
[30]. The transition from protolanguage to language is then
explained by a long history of human cultural evolution.
The theory is supported by the findings that overlapping
brain activity is observed in Brocas for perceiving language
and tool use [31], both of which involve manipulation of
complex hierarchical structures. Furthermore, as Brocas area
is the possible homologue of the monkey ventral premotor
cortex where mirror neurons for grasping are located, neural
processes for manipulation and action understanding may be
the evolutionary bases of language [32].
The crucial finding, refered to in this theory, was that the
mirror system activity in the human frontal cortex was found
to be in or near Brocas area, which had been considered
as an area of language processing. They hypothesized that
changes in the brain that provide the substrate for tool use and
language and that allow us to cumulate innovations through
cultural evolution are the key innovations in language evolu-
tion. The ability to make and recognize praxic actions may
have provided the basis for the ability to make and recognize
communicative manual gestures, with this in turn providing the
evolutionary basis for brain mechanisms supporting the parity
property of language: In other words, the evolution of language
correlated with the development of mirror neurons that enabled
humans to perform manipulation of physical objects, and
gestures for communication and language use [33].
Therefore, it appears that in highly evolved animals, brains
have “invented” basic symbols that may be used in rudi-
mentary planning and decision making. In pre-humans, these
basic symbols might have triggered an accelerated evolution
once they were externalized via utterances, paving the way for
speech and language evolution.
C. Cognitive science viewpoint: from concepts to symbols
Cognitive scientists have been considering symbol systems
for many decades [3]. Similar to our discussion above (Sec-
tion III-A), most cognitive scientists and psychologists agree
that the notion of a concept is very important in understanding
symbols as well as cognition, as it enables us to classify,
understand, predict, reason, and communicate [34].
However, researchers do not necessarily agree on the defini-
tion of concept. Furthermore, there is a related term, category
and its cognitive competence called categorization, which
needs to be distinguished from concept.
The following may help. When we saw a dog, we usually
think “we saw a dog,” but not “we saw a hairy living organism
with two eyes, four legs, pointy teeth, etc.” That is, instead of
simultaneously interpreting the abundant individual features of
an entity, we usually categorize the entity into one class (or a
few classes). Thus, categorization can be seen as an effective
data encoding process that compresses the information of
many features into a few classes. Likewise, using a category
can be interpreted as a data decoding process that extracts
principal information (e.g., variances and correlations) about
a set of features that the category has.
Let us now try to distinguish concept from category. One
of the most accepted definitions of concept is that it corre-
sponds to an internal (memory) representation of classes of
things [34]–[36]. Different from this, one of the most accepted
definitions of category is that of a set of entities or examples
selected (picked out) by the belonging concept [34], [35].
Clearly, those two terms are closely related and, thus, often
used interchangeably in cognitive science and psychology,
leading to controversies. For example, one notable source
of disagreement concerns the internal representation asking
about possible systems of symbols on which the internal
representation of concept could be built. This mainly concerns
the difference between an amodal symbol system (ASS) as
compared to a perceptual symbol system (PSS) [36], [37].
A symbol system that uses symbols independently of their
(perceptual) origin as atoms of knowledge is called an amodal
symbol system (ASS). However, Barsalou more strongly con-
centrated on the perceptual aspects of symbol systems and
proposed the PSS [38]. A PSS puts a central emphasis on
multimodal perceptual experiences as the basis of its symbols.
Let us describe the differences between ASS and PSS in
more detail.
First, the notion of category is different in ASS and PSS.
ASS assumes that categories are internally represented by
symbols without any modality, where symbol means a discrete
variable, which is often given by a word (a name of a concept).
By contrast, in PSS, every category is internally represented
by symbols from several different modalities originating in the
sensorimotor system and resulting in distributed and overlap-
ping representations. This difference is crucial, because the
symbol grounding problem remains in ASS, whereas symbols
in PSS are directly related to perceptual experiences and, thus,
the meanings of symbols are well grounded [1].
PSS furthermore assumes that categories are (implicitly
or explicitly) consolidated by simulating several candidate
categories. For this, distributed and complexly connected per-
ceptual symbols with background information (i.e., context
or situations) are used. This suggests that categorization is a
dynamic process and is highly influenced by the context and
situation. From the viewpoint of PSS, categorization is, thus,
situated and flexibly bound to the world. This allows humans
to be highly adaptive and to exhibit intelligence across several
domains.
Second, how concepts are used to realize categories is also
different. ASS assumes that a concept is acquired knowledge
that resides in long-term memory, and, thus, concepts are more
or less static. On the contrary, PSS assumes that concepts are
dynamic. Note that in this way, there is a certain similarity
between PSS and Peircean semiotics.
There is an interesting phenomenon called ad hoc category.
An ad hoc category is a spontaneously created category to
achieve a given goal within a certain context [39]. For exam-
ple, “things to take on a camping trip” is an ad hoc category.
Ad hoc categories are shown to have the same typical effects
seen in more conventional categories such as dogs and furni-
ture. This somewhat odd but interesting cognitive phenomenon
can be well described by dynamic simulation processes that
utilize situation-dependent, multimodal perceptual symbols in
7PSS. Different from this, ASS cannot account for ad hoc
categories because of its static and situation-insensitive nature.
To date, the ASS perspective still dominates in cognitive
science and psychology, probably because it has been more
manageable to conduct research assuming static ASS-like
representations. PSS, however, seems to be better matched to
the dynamics of brain structures and activities, and to robots
that need to deal with real-world sensorimotor information.
It offers a more natural, distributed representation compatible
with modern theories of the dynamic restructuring of neuronal
cell assemblies reflecting various memory contents [40], [41].
So far, however, it has been quite difficult to empirically
evaluate the PSS theory as a whole. Potentially, building better
computational models for symbol emergence in cognitive de-
velopmental systems might aid in making progress concerning
the ASS–PSS controversy in cognitive science. This review
certainly leans more toward PSS than ASS.
D. Developmental psychology viewpoint: from behaviors to
symbols
The idea that symbols and symbol manipulation emerge
from infants’ physical and social interactions with the world,
prior to their first words and linguistic activity, has been
actively discussed since the times of the pioneers of devel-
opmental psychology.
1) Theories of symbol development: The theories of symbol
emergence and development in developmental psychology can
be separated into two categories: classical and contemporary.
Classical accounts were developed by Piaget, Vygotsky, and
Werner and Kaplan, and contemporary accounts can be sepa-
rated into three main approaches: empiricist, nativist, and con-
structivist. For classical theories, the emergence of symbolic
representation is an active process and all authors emphasize
the importance of social interaction. However, the proposed
mechanisms were different. Piaget’s book La formation du
symbol [42] as well as the book of Werner and Kaplan
entitled Symbol formation [43] already discussed the gradual
emergence of symbols from nonlinguistic forms of symbol-
like functioning, and the integration of the formed structures
into language skills. In contemporary accounts, empiricist and
nativist theories consider a child to be a passive container,
whereas constructivist theories see a child as an active agent
trying to construct meaning through social interaction and
communication [44]. According to Mandler, the traditional
view of infants inability of concept formation and use is
flawed. Her studies on recall, conceptual categorization, and
inductive generalization have shown that infants can form
preverbal concepts. An infant can form animals and inani-
mate distinction from only motion and spatial information.
Mandler argues that basic preverbal concepts are derived from
the spatial information and suggests that perceptual meaning
analysis creates preverbal concepts with the form of image-
schemas [45].
The levels of consciousness model developed by Zelazo
consists of four levels [46]. The first level is called stimulus
bound, ranging from birth to 7 months of age, in which
an infant has representations tied to stimuli. In the second
level, which is decoupling of symbols, ranging between 8
and 18 months, infants can substitute symbols for stimuli in
their working memory. The third level is named symbols as
symbols, in which children from 18 months to five years of
age show genuine symbolic thought and can engage in pretend
play. Starting from five years of age, the fourth level is quality
of symbol-referent relations. In this stage, children can assess
the quality of the relationship between symbol and referent;
and finally can understand ambiguity, sarcasm, artistic rep-
resentation, and reasoning scientifically [46]. For Tomasello,
symbolic communication emerges as a way of manipulating
the attention of others to a feature of an object or an object
in general. Up to 9 months of age, behaviors of children are
dyadic. Within the age range of 9–12 months, new behaviors
emerge that include joint attention and triadic relationship, i.e.,
self, other and object. This is the first time when an infant
has the ability of joint engagement, social referencing, and
imitation. He argues that for infants to understand or engage
in symbolic convention, they should see others as intentional
agents with a goal [47]. This view reminds us that the social
abilities of an agent would also be critical. Theories of symbol
emergence in developmental psychology have been briefly
mentioned here. For further information, please see [44].
2) Precursors of symbolic functioning: Bates et al. [48]
discuss that the onset and development of communicative
intentions and conventional signals (such as pointing or crying
for an unreachable toy), observed between 9 and 13 months,
can be viewed as a precursor of symbolic communication.
Before 9 months, infants can use some signals (such as
crying). However, these signals are geared more toward the
referent object than toward the adult that can help. By 9
months, signals and gestures become clear, consistent and
intentional. For example, previously object-targeted cry sig-
nals are now aimed at adults. This can be verified through
frequent eye contact and checks for feedback. Infants also start
using clear and consistent vocal gestures, word-like sounds in
request sequences, albeit in very context-bounded situations.
Whereas these intentional communications and signals become
more stable, regular, and predictable, Bates discusses that this
is not considered to be standard symbolic communication:
“Conventional communication is not symbolic communication
until we can infer that the child has objectified the vehicle-
referent relationship to some extent, realizing that the vehicle,
i.e., sign, can be substituted for its referent for certain pur-
poses, at the same time the symbol is not the same thing as
its referent” [48, p. 38]. For example, temporal separation of
vocal gestures from the actual timing of the activity might be
viewed as differentiation of the symbol from its referent, and
considered to be truly symbolic activity, following Werner and
Kaplan [43].
The period before the first words also corresponds to
Piaget’s sensorimotor stage V, the stage where infants can
differentiate means from ends and use novel means for familiar
ends. After approximately 9 months of age, infants start using
learned affordances to achieve certain goals, predicting desired
changes in the environment to achieve the goals, and executing
the corresponding actions [49]–[51]. By 12 months, they can
make multistep plans using learned affordances and perform
8sequencing of the learned action–effect mappings for different
tasks. For example, they can reach a distant toy resting on
a towel by first pulling the towel or retrieve an object on a
support after removing an obstructing barrier [52]. These data
suggest the importance of early sensorimotor and social skill
development in infants that are probably integrated into the
language and reasoning network, where symbols and symbol
manipulations play an important role. Learning a symbol
system is also a continuous process, in which infants benefit
from different principles such as similarity, conventionality,
segmentation, and embodiment [53].
When we are away from ASS and do not assume pre-
existing linguistic knowledge, our view has common grounds
with Tomasello’s usage-based theory of language acquisi-
tion [54], [55]. The usage-based approach to linguistic commu-
nication has two aphorisms, i.e., meaning is use, and structure
emerges from use. The first aphorism argues that the meanings
should be rooted in how people use linguistic conventions
to achieve social ends. The second argues that the meaning-
based grammatical constructions should emerge from individ-
ual acts of language use. It is argued that, at around one year,
children become equipped with two sets of cognitive skills,
i.e., intention-reading and pattern-finding. Intention-reading
performs the central role in the social-pragmatic approach to
language acquisition. Pattern-finding includes categorization,
analogy, and distributional analysis. This performs the cen-
tral role in grammar construction. The usage-based theory
of language acquisition is totally in line with the symbol
emergence in cognitive systems, because both put importance
on the bottom-up formation of symbolic/linguistic knowledge
in cognitive systems.
The first words, which can be seen as the clear indication
of symbolic knowledge, are observed at around 12 months
of age, when infants discover that things have names. For
a thorough review of symbol emergence in infants and the
role of nonlinguistic developments in symbol and language
acquisition, see [48].
3) Language, graphical, and play symbolic systems: The
emergence of symbolic functioning is observed in infants
in different domains, such as comprehension and production
of verbal or sign language, gestures, graphic symbols, and
(pretend) play. Efforts to clarify these range from investigating
the capabilities of different age groups in understanding the
difference between symbol and referent using symbolic objects
such as pictures, maps, videos, and scale models [56] to assess-
ing the abilities of children in pretend play, which involves the
ability to play with an object as if it were a different one [57].
Whereas the former is related to dual representation problem
referring to understanding the symbol-referent relationship, the
latter is related to the triune representation problem referring
to using objects in a symbolic way. It is important to note
that related abilities of infants in different domains appear to
reach common milestones. Gesture and language abilities, for
example, follow the same stages, such as repetitive action,
symbolic use, and combinatorial use on the same schedule
[58]. Both language and play acquisition begin with presym-
bolic structures, where action and meaning are fused (e.g.,
plays only related to infant’s own sensorimotor repertoire),
then abstract and agent-independent symbols emerge in both
domains, and finally combinatorial use of the abstract symbols
is observed [59].
Acquisition of language, among these domains, is special in
humans. Young infants are capable of producing language-like
sounds early in their first year: they can produce canonical
babbles followed by protowords at month 7 and first words
shortly after the first birthdate [60]. As we discussed in the pre-
vious subsection, the emergence of language comprehension
is estimated to be around 9 to 10 months of age and language
production in the first half of the second year [60]. The
symbolic status of some of the early words might be specific to
events and contexts, whereas other words might be used across
a range of contexts [61]. With the development of naming
insight early in the second year, when the child discovers
that things have names, and names and their references are
arbitrarily related, one can argue that symbolic functioning is
in operation in the language domain.
Graphical or pictorial symbolic capability, however, is ob-
served later: 2.5 year old children (but not younger ones) can
retrieve hidden objects when the pictures of these objects are
presented [62], or can match pictorial symbols with imaginary
outcomes of actions given pictures of objects to which actions
are applied [63].
Whereas there is no consensus on the existence of a single
symbolic function/system that develops during early childhood
and is realized in different domains, the symbolic systems in
different domains (1) heavily influence each other, and (2) are
significantly affected by scaffolding from the caregivers. In
various experiments, it was shown that privileged and early
developing symbol system of language is used by children
in seemingly symbolic functions in the graphics and play
domains. The object retrieval task based on pictorial symbols,
for example, can be achieved by 2.5 years old children if the
pictorial symbols can be distinguished verbally by the children
(e.g., dog vs. cat - golden retriever vs. German shepherd)
[64]. Only after 3 years of age, children gain the capability to
retrieve objects only using on their pictorial symbolic descrip-
tion without using language support. However, Callaghan and
Rankin also showed that with more training, children could
acquire the capability of pure pictorial symbolic functioning
earlier than 3 years old [59].
From this discussion, we can conclude that early acquisition
of the language symbol system compared to other domains
is possibly due to the heavy parental scaffolding from birth
[65], the symbol systems observable in different domains have
similar developmental stages, they interact with each other, and
finally their development depends on the amount of scaffolding
and maturity of the system.
IV. PROBLEM HISTORY 2: SYMBOL EMERGENCE IN
ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS
The main challenge concerning symbol emergence in cogni-
tive developmental systems is to create artificial systems, e.g.,
robots, that can form and manipulate rich representations of
categories and concepts. Our overview will concentrate on this
problem in AI and machine learning.
9A. Artificial intelligence viewpoint: from tokens to symbols
Originally, the idea of a symbol system in AI had its
roots in mathematical/symbolic logic because all programming
languages are based on this. Alas, this led to quite an inflexible
image concerning the term symbol.
Inspired by the work of Newell [3], AI has tended to
consider a symbol as the minimum element of intelligence
and this way of thinking is hugely influenced by the physical
symbol system hypothesis [2, p.116] (see Section III-C ):
“A physical symbol system consists of a set of
entities, called symbols, which are physical patterns
that can occur as components of another type of
entity called an expression (or symbol structure).
Thus, a symbol structure is composed of many
instances (or tokens) of symbols related in some
physical way (such as: token being next to another).
At any instant of time, the system will contain a
collection of these symbol structures.”
This notion creates a strong link between a token in a Turing
machine and a symbol. However, there are two major prob-
lems with this definition, generated by two strong underlying
assumptions.
First, the physical symbol system hypothesis assumes that
a symbol exists without any explicit connection to real-
world information. Owing to the missing link between such
symbols and the real world, such a physical symbol system is
ungrounded, and therefore unable to function appropriately in
complex environments. Later studies on symbol grounding [1],
[66], symbol anchoring [67], and the “intelligence without rep-
resentation” argument [68], [69], challenged the conventional
understanding about the implementation of a symbol system.
Second, the token–symbol analogy is based on the assump-
tion that a symbol deterministically represents a concept that
does not change its meaning depending on the context or
interpretation. However, this view is very different from that
discussed in semiotics (see Section II). There, the human (in-
terpretant) takes a central role in the process of symbolization.
This generates confusion among researchers, especially in
interdisciplinary fields such as cognitive systems, in which
aspects of robotics and AI are combined with psychology,
neuroscience, and social science, attempting to advance our
understanding of human cognition and interaction by using
a constructive approach. Programming-language-like symbols
and human-meaning-like symbols are often conflated, and the
term symbol is used to describe both (i) an atomic element
of reasoning and (ii) a sign used in human interaction and
communication.
Indeed, a general and practical definition of symbol that
includes both aspects would be desirable. At the same time, the
different meanings of this broad concept should be kept clear.
In some of the literature on symbol grounding [70] these two
aspects are referred to as physical symbol grounding [71] and
social symbol grounding [72]. Another definition is proposed
by Steels [73], who refers to these different types of symbols
as c-symbols and m-symbols, respectively, pointing out the
ill-posed characteristics of the original symbol grounding
problem.
Studies in developmental robotics have been conducted to
solve the symbol grounding problem. For example, Steels et
al. have been tackling this problem using language games
from the evolutionary viewpoint [74], [75]. Cangelosi et al.
developed robotic models for symbol grounding [76], [77]. For
the further information please see [53]. Steels even said “the
symbol grounding problem has been solved [73].” However, it
is still difficult for us to develop a robot that can learn language
in a bottom-up manner and start communicating with people.
To deal with these problems, we need to move on from the
symbol grounding problem to symbol emergence by taking
the process of bottom-up organization of symbol systems into
consideration. This means that we need to develop a learnable
computational model representing PSS that is also affected
by social interactions, i.e., both physical and social symbol
grounding should be taken into consideration.
B. Pattern recognition viewpoint: from labels to symbols
Pattern recognition methods, e.g., image and speech recog-
nition, have made great progress with deep learning for about
five years [78]–[81]. Most pattern recognition systems are
based on supervised learning. A supervised learning system
is trained with input data and supervisory signals, i.e., desired
output data. The supervisory signals are often called label data
because they represent ground truth class labels.
What are symbols in pattern recognition tasks? Indeed, the
class labels mentioned above were regarded as signs represent-
ing concepts of objects and the input data as signs observed
from objects. Image recognition can, thus, be considered
as a mapping between an object and a sign representing a
concept. Note that, here, they assume that there is a fixed
concept defining the relationship between signs and objects.
Additionally, the relationship is defined by human labelers
from outside of the cognitive system, i.e., machine learning
system. This means the pattern recognition problem does not
treat the emergence of symbols. For example, when an image
recognition system tries to recognize an apple in the pixels of
an image, the system will try to map these pixels, i.e., signs,
obtained from the object to the sign “apple.” The same holds
true for speech recognition, in which sound waves are mapped
to words.
The general pipeline for image or speech recognition is
shown in Fig. 4. Conventional recognition systems use pre-
defined low-level features, mostly defined by a human, to
structure the input data prior to recognition. Modern deep
learning performs end-to-end learning and features exist only
implicitly therein (as the activation structures of the hidden
layers) [78], but it also makes supervised-learning-based pat-
tern recognition a well-defined problem. Alas, this assumption
led to large side effects on our way toward understanding
symbol systems. From the above, it is clear that this type of
pattern recognition essentially assumes static symbol systems.
However, when we look at the interior of the pattern recog-
nition systems using deep neural networks, we can find that
neural networks form internal representations dynamically,
even though the learning process is governed by static symbol
systems. For example, it was found that convolutional neural
10
Concepts
Words
Phonemes
Speech signals
Discretized
Signs
(Transcribed data)
Categories
High-level
representations
Low-level
representations
Visual signals
Discretized 
Signs
(Class labels)
Label data
Supervised learning
(Back propagation)
Low-level
representations
 
Speech recognition Image recognition
Fig. 4. Pattern recognition systems, e.g., image recognition and speech
recognition systems, usually presume a hierarchical structure of the target
data. Label data, usually corresponding to a sign representing a concept, is
given by supervision in the training process.
networks (CNNs) form low-level feature representations in the
shallow layers and high-level feature representations in the
deep layers [78]. Those features themselves are not symbols.
However, to realize symbol emergence in cognitive systems
the cognitive dynamics that form rich internal representations
are crucial.
In summary, pattern recognition has been providing many
useful technologies for grounding labels (signs) by real-world
sensory information. However, these methods generally as-
sume a very simple dyadic notion about symbols, i.e., the
mapping between objects and their labels. From a develop-
mental viewpoint, a neonatal development system cannot get
label data directly as discretized signals input to its internal
cognitive system. Thus, most supervised-leaning-based pattern
recognition system cannot be regarded as a constructive model
of human development and symbol emergence.
C. Unsupervised learning viewpoint: from multimodal catego-
rization to symbols
It has been shown by a wide variety of studies that it is
possible to create an internal representation system that inter-
nalizes a symbol system, reproduces categories, and preserves
concepts by using unsupervised clustering techniques [5], [82].
One example where the complete chain from sensorimotor
experience to language symbols has been addressed is the
work of Nakamura et al. as discussed in the following.
The central goal of the studies was that a robot creates
a certain conceptual structure by categorizing its own sen-
sorimotor experiences. When this happens using multimodal
sensorimotor information, this can be regarded as a PSS
model. In addition, the use of multimodal sensorimotor infor-
mation for forming categories is important because it enables
the cognitive system to perform cross-modal prediction. For
example, humans can usually predict whether it is hard or soft
simply by looking at a particular cup, e.g., paper or porcelain.
This means that you can predict tactile information only from
visual information through such a cross-modal inference. This
type of embodied simulation is considered as a crucial function
of PSS.
This has been called multimodal object categorization,
realized by applying a hierarchical Bayesian model to
robotics [83]. It can be achieved by multimodal latent Dirichlet
allocation (MLDA), which is a multimodal extension of latent
Dirichlet allocation (LDA)—a widely known probabilistic
topic model [84]. This way, a robot can form object categories
using visual, auditory, and tactile information acquired by
itself.
An important point here is that the sensorimotor information
acquired by the robot generates categories that are, at first,
only suitable for this robot. However, it is also possible to
add words as an additional mode of information [83]. This
way, the created categories become much closer to human
categories, owing to the co-occurrence of words and the
similar multimodal sensory information. Thus, this represents
a probabilistic association of words, signs, with a multimodal
category, which related to a certain concept—a process of
symbol formation. This also makes it possible to formulate a
semantic understanding of words as a prediction of multimodal
information through categories.
One interesting extension of this model concerns the self-
acquisition of language combining automatic speech recogni-
tion with the MLDA system. Here, unsupervised morphologi-
cal analysis [85] is performed on phoneme recognition results
in order to acquire a vocabulary. The point of this model
is that multimodal categories are used for learning lexical
information and vice versa. This way, the robot could acquire
approximately 70 appropriate words through interaction with
a user over 1 month [86]. This suggests that unsupervised
learning, e.g., multimodal object categorization, can provide
a basic internal representation system for primal language
learning.
There have been many related studies. For example,
Taniguchi introduced the idea of spatial concept and built
a machine learning system to enable a robot to form place
categories and learn place names [87], [88]. Mangin proposed
multimodal concept formation using a non-negative matrix
factorization method [89]. Ugur et al. studied the discovery
of predictable effect categories by grouping the interactions
that produce similar effects [90]. They utilized a standard
clustering method with varying maximal numbers of clusters,
and accepted a number of clusters only if the corresponding
effect categories could be reliably predicted with classifiers
that take object features and actions as inputs. Predictability
also performs a central role in the series of studies by Tani et
al. [91].
All of these studies suggest that bottom-up concept forma-
tion, using sensorimotor information obtained by a robot itself,
is possible, and this appears to be a promising avenue for
future research.
D. Reinforcement learning viewpoint: from states and actions
to symbols
Whereas the aforementioned work focuses on finding struc-
ture in sensory information, decision-making and behavior
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learning are fundamental components of cognitive systems
as well. This problem is often formulated as a reinforcement
learning problem [92]. The goal of a reinforcement learning
agent is to find an optimal policy that can maximize the total
accumulated reward obtained from its environment. In the
context of reinforcement learning, the term symbol has been
used related to state and action abstraction with the belief
that symbol is an abstract discrete token under the conceptual
influence of symbolic AI.
Reinforcement learning is most commonly formulated as
learning over a Markov decision process, which often assumes
that an agent has a discrete state–action space. However, if
its action and state spaces are too large, the curse of dimen-
sionality prevents the agent from learning adequate policies.
Therefore, how to design a compact and discrete state–action
space for an agent, or how to enable the agent to perform state
and action abstraction were regarded as crucial problems in the
history of reinforcement learning. Discrete states and actions
formed through some sort of abstraction, especially when they
are meaningful/interpretable units of states or actions, have
often been regarded as symbols or concepts in a naive way.
However, the internal feature representations, i.e., abstracted
states, can not have any nature of symbols if they do not have
semiosis, given our definition of symbols in this paper.
State abstraction was commonly treated as a discretization
of the state space described by a discrete set of symbols, as in
some form of tile coding [93]. Another way of abstraction is to
use a function approximation that can map continuous states
or a large discrete state space directly to action values. For
example, these abstract states may be represented by activa-
tions in neural networks, i.e., distributed representations [94].
This has more recently led to an explosion of work in deep
reinforcement learning (DRL), which has involved behavior
learning against discovered, higher-level representations of
sensory information [95]. In the context of DRL, state ab-
straction is represented in the same way as high-level feature
representation in CNNs in pattern recognition systems [78].
Action abstraction has similarly provided a useful mecha-
nism for learning. Operating and learning exclusively at the
level of action primitives is a slow process, particularly when
the same sequence of actions is required in multiple locations.
Action hierarchies can then be defined through options or
macro-actions [96], which are defined as local controllers
and constructed from primitive actions (or simpler options).
These can then be treated as new actions, and can be used in
planning as single atoms or symbols referencing more complex
behaviors [97]. In the reinforcement learning literature, these
are learned as behaviors with some functional invariance, for
example as controllers that lead to bottleneck states [98], or as
commonly occurring sub-behaviors [99]. Additionally, in more
recent work, hierarchies of actions can be defined to allow for
concurrent, rather than sequential, execution [100].
These different forms of abstraction are not only useful for
improving the tractability of problems, but they also provide
a useful form of knowledge transfer, where solving one task
provides an encoding of the environment that facilitates better
performance on the next task [101]. Mugan and Kuipers [102]
implemented a system that learns qualitative representations
of states and predictive models in a bottom-up manner by
discretizing the continuous variables of the environment. In
another study, Konidaris et al. studied the construction of
“symbols” that can be directly used as preconditions and
effects of actions for the generation of deterministic [103] and
probabilistic [104] plans in simulated environments. Note that
the usage of the term symbols in this study simply corresponds
to internal feature representations, even though it looks like
“symbols” in terms of symbolic AI.
These studies all investigated how to form symbols, i.e.,
internal feature representations, in the continuous sensorimotor
space of the robot. However, complex symbols can be formed
by combining predefined or already-learned symbols. For
example, Pasula et al. [105] and Lang et al. [106] studied
the learning of symbolic operators using predefined predicates.
Ugur et al. re-used the previously discovered symbols in
generating plans in novel settings [107], [108].
In the reinforcement learning literature, most work related to
symbol emergence was about the formation of internal feature
representation systems, in particular state–action abstractions,
for efficient behavior learning. State and action abstraction
is regarded as a part of symbol emergence, but not symbol
emergence itself.
Recently, several studies extended the framework of rein-
forcement learning and enabled an agent to learn interpretation
of linguistic, i.e., symbolic, input in the context of DRL [109].
Most of the studies remain at the preliminary stage from the
viewpoint of natural language understanding. However, this
is also a promising approach to model symbol emergence in
cognitive developmental systems.
E. Dynamical systems viewpoint: from attractors to symbols
Any agent (human, animal, or robot), which is physically
embodied and embedded in its environment, can be described
as a continuous dynamical system. The question, which has
been addressed by several researchers, is whether discrete
states or proto-symbols can emerge and be identified in such
systems.
The notion of attractors in a nonlinear dynamical system
provides a natural connection: the attractor (no matter whether
a fixed point or a limit cycle) can be seen as a discrete entity
and there would typically be only a limited number of them.
Pfeifer and Bongard [11, pp. 153–159] offer the example of
a running animal or robot, where the different gaits (such
as walk, trot, gallop) would correspond to attractors of the
brain-body-environment system. This could be identified by
an outside observer, but, importantly, also by the agent itself
in the sensorimotor space accessible to its neural system.
Furthermore, one can imagine other, downstream networks in
the agent’s brain that would operate with these proto-symbols,
perhaps instantiating a primitive form of “symbol processing.”
The gaits and the sensorimotor structure they induce would
influence the dynamics of the downstream networks, and
conversely the low-level network could be influenced by the
“symbolic” level through the motor signals, corresponding to
gait selection on the part of the agent. A related but more
formal account of “dynamics-based information processing”
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dealing with mapping between motion space and symbol
space in a humanoid robot was put forth by Okada and
Nakamura [110].
This question is also addressed by Kuniyoshi et al. [111],
who make use of the mathematical concept of structural
stability: the claim is that a “global information structure” will
emerge from the interaction of the body with the environment.
Kuniyoshi concludes that because of the discrete and persistent
nature, one can identify this global information structure with
the notion of symbols. This account is further extended to the
interaction of multiple agents, moving from intra-dynamics
(like the gaits as attractors) to inter-dynamics.
Whereas these studies have addressed artificial agents, we
note that their viewpoints are also strongly related to the above
discussion about the mirror system in primates as a possible
neural instantiation of a proto-symbol structure.
V. INTEGRATIVE VIEWPOINT
In this section, we integrate the viewpoints described in
Sections III and IV, and provide a unified viewpoint on symbol
emergence.
A. Wrapping things up (from the perspective of PSS)
It has been a generally accepted view in AI (Section IV)
and cognitive science (Section III-C) to regard symbol systems
as internal representation systems. Cognitive neuroscience
also follows this way of thinking (III-B). However, this idea
has been affected by the misconception that “symbols are a
discrete token in our mind” given by the physical symbol
system hypothesis. There are no discrete tokens in our brain,
and a symbol in our society is not such a type of static thing as
a broad range of social, cultural, and linguistic studies suggest.
The misconception even introduced confusion in the usage
of related terms, e.g., internal representation system, concept,
category, symbol, and feature representation. They are used
with different meanings by different people and scientific
communities related to symbol systems.
Furthermore, we discussed that there are two types of
usages of the term, symbol system, considered by the different
fields: symbol systems in society as compared to the internal
representational systems in our brain. Whereas both are clearly
linked to each other through processes of externalization, e.g.,
language generation and understanding, they are also often
confused in the literature. In particular, symbolic AI and in
turn, cognitive science, have been totally confusing them.
In this paper, we start with PSS. The focus on PSS chosen
here is motivated by its more dynamic nature that better fits the
requirements of cognitive developmental systems. Concerning
PSS, we can summarize that this theory assumes that internal
representation systems, i.e., PSSs, are formed in a bottom-up
manner from perceptual states that arise in sensorimotor sys-
tems. A perceptual state is formed by a neural representation
of the physical input and this can also be supplemented by a
conscious experience, a subset of perceptual states is stored in
long-term memory. Thus, these perceptual memory contents
can function as concepts, standing for referents in the world,
constituting the representations that underlie cognition.
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Fig. 5. Overview of a symbol emergence system [5]. Cognitive developmental
systems including autonomous robots need to be elements of the system to
perform semiotic communication.
The bottom-up development assumed by PSS leads to the
fact that such a PSS can be regarded as a self-organization
process of multimodal sensorimotor information in our brain.
This view is quite similar to the dynamics of the schema
model, proposed by Piaget to explain human development
during the sensorimotor period.
What we need here for an integration of all this is as follows.
(1) If we distinguish symbol systems in society and those in
our mental systems, and (2) if we consider the dynamics and
uncertainty in symbol systems, and (3) if we also take the
context dependency of symbols (i.e., semiosis) into account,
and, finally, (4) if we succeed in combining the different
(society versus internal) levels of symbolization, then we will
get closer to an integrative viewpoint of a symbol system.
B. Symbol emergence systems
Figure 5 shows a schematic illustration of symbol emer-
gence systems, describing a potential path to symbol emer-
gence in a multiagent system [5]. In this figure, we distinguish
between an internal representational system and a symbol
system owned by a community or a society.
At the start, human infants form their object categories
and motion primitives through physical interaction with their
environment. Soon, however, they will also generate signs,
e.g., speech signals and gestures, to accompany their actions,
or to express their wishes. Alongside the development of the
infants’ ability to generate signs, their parents and other people
learn how to interpret, but also correct, the signs of the infants.
Thus, this type of mutual symbol negotiation process gradually
realizes semiotic communication.
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Fig. 6. Multimodal fusion of sensorimotor information and self-organization of concepts and symbols.
The child’s symbols, that had originated from bottom-up
sensorimotor processes, will in this way drift toward the
symbol system shared by their community, at first the infant
and parents. Hence, language learning can be regarded as both
the bottom-up formation process and the internalization of a
symbol system shared in a community. This view aligns with
Tomasello’s usage-based theory of language acquisition [55].
In general, all such systems evolve within their communities
and they follow certain rules, which impose constraints on
all agents that make use of them. Without following these
rules, e.g., semantics, syntax, and pragmatics, communication
would be hard or even impossible. Any agent is free to form
categories and signs solely based on perceptions and actions,
but when an agent needs to communicate using signs, they
must be standardized throughout its community. Therefore,
both bottom-up organization and top-down constraints are
crucial in our symbol systems. This leads us to the concept of
symbol emergence systems.
The concept of emergence comes from studies of complex
systems. A complex system that shows emergence displays
a macroscopic property at some higher level that arises in a
bottom-up manner based on interactions among the system’s
lower-level entities. In turn, the macroscopic property con-
strains the behaviors of the lower-level entities. Ultimately, this
so-called emergent high-level property endows the system with
a new function, which cannot be generated by the individual
low-level components on their own. The interaction between
high and low levels in such a system, consisting of bottom-up
organization and the top-down constraining, is called a micro–
macro loop.
Figure 5 depicts this for our case. The sensorimotor and also
the direct social interaction processes of the individual reside
at the lower levels. The resulting symbol system represents a
higher-level structure, which—as described above—constrains
the lower levels. Hence, such symbol systems may well be
regarded as an emergent structure with a typical example of
a micro–macro loop. Therefore, it may be better to call it an
emergent symbol system, distinguishing it from conventional
physical symbol system in the old-fashioned AI. As a whole,
the multi-agent system can be regarded as a complex system
with emergent property producing functions, i.e., semiotic
communications. Therefore, it is fair to say this is a type of an
emergent system. Thus, we call this complex system a symbol
emergence system.
To become an element of a symbol emergence system, the
element, e.g., a person or a cognitive robot, must have the
cognitive capability to form an internal representation system,
i.e., PSS, and to perform symbol negotiation. Figure 6 shows
an abstract diagram of a partial structure of a cognitive system
required for an agent participating in a symbol emergence
system. We already discussed above, when summarizing PSS,
how individual cognitive traits, some of which are shown
in this figure, arise based on multimodal sensorimotor in-
formation, and also how internal representations are formed
as multimodal concepts. Hence, information from different
modalities is highly intertwined. The figure also emphasizes
several high-level aspects such as syntax, semantics, and prag-
matics. For us, syntax not only plays a role in language but it
has been suggested that syntactic structures are of fundamental
importance for our action planning capabilities, for example in
manipulation (see Section III-A and [14]). Conversely, it has
also been hypothesized that the evolution of syntactic planning
capabilities became a scaffold of the evolution of language.
Some studies have already shown that structures in an internal
representation system analogous to action grammar emerge
as distributed representations in neuro-dynamic systems [91].
One should likely think of this as an upward-winding spiral,
where one process drives the other and vice versa. This knowl-
edge should be self-organized as an internal representation
system in a distributed manner. We expect that we can develop
neural network-based and/or probabilistic models to artificially
realize such learning dynamics in the near future.
C. Redefinition of the terminology
In this section, we try to identify the differences between
terms related to symbols, from the viewpoint of a symbol
emergence system, to address possible confusion in future
interdisciplinary research.
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1) Concept and category: These two terms are—as men-
tioned above—often used interchangeably across the literature,
even in cognitive science. Here, we would like to offer a
practical solution to disentangle this.
Category:
A category corresponds to a referent, i.e. an object in
semiosis, where exemplars of the object are invoked by a
perception or a thought process. Categories are influenced by
contextual information. Categories can be formed and inferred
by an agent from sensorimotor information, i.e., features,
alone without any labeled data. For example, the MLDA-
based approach can categorize objects into object categories
probabilistically [112]–[118]. A multimodal autoencoder can
also perform a similar task. In order to make sense for an agent
that acts in some world, categories need to be based on real-
world experiences. This can either happen directly through
forming a category from sensorimotor inputs, or indirectly
through inferring a category from entities in memory.
Categories can be memorized in long-term memory, but im-
portantly, they are not static. Instead they update themselves in
long-term memory by the interactions between actual objects,
instances, relations, or events in the world. We have many
relatively static categories in our memory system and society
(such as fruit, car, etc.), where the properties that define these
categories are more or less static; these help us structure our
world. We can also dynamically infer or generate categories in
a real-time manner. Ad hoc categories, e.g. things to take on
a camping trip, are a good example for this. Furthermore, we
assume we can distinguish items belonging to one category
from those in another one using categorical recognition.
In summary, categories are very much an exemplar-based
idea, and always have an inference process using category-
determining features that make an object a member of the
category. This process can be regarded as semiosis.
Concept: A concept, on the contrary, is usually regarded
as a context-independent internal representation embedded
in long-term memory, as opposed to a category which is
an exemplar-based idea. When we follow the idea of PSS,
cross/multimodal simulation is a crucial function of a concept,
i.e., perceptual symbol. Here, the concepts embedded in long-
term memory allow the cognitive system to predict other
modality information from the given modality information
through inference. When we hear a speech signal “apple”, we
can infer its color, shape and taste via a concept formed using
multimodal sensorimotor information. On the contrary, we can
infer the object’s name, i.e., “apple”, from its color, shape and
taste information. The semantic essence of a category can be
used to infer categories and other useful information. This
definition fits with the idea of PSS.
Difference between semantic essence of exemplars, and
categories can also be understood by means of an example. Let
us consider the category of all possible Go games, determined
by their shared features. As we know, AlphaGo [119] can by
now beat the best Go players in the world. Within AlphaGo
the representation of how to play a game is encoded in the
network weights. Neither AlphaGo itself nor anyone else can
extract from these weights and explain the goal of Go and
the game strategiesr required to achieve it. Goal and strategy
constitute in this example what we would call the essence
of the Go-game category. We would argue, to be able to say
that an agent has a oncept of Go, those strategies need to
be represented in an extractable and explainable way. The fact
that we, humans, can talk about strategies of playing Go makes
clear that for us that this is true. We, after learning the game,
can extract strategies of play. It is, however, not the fact that
we do extract them explicitly, but rather the fact that they can
be extracted or explained linguistically. This means concepts
should have connections with explanations using language,
i.e., symbol systems. Furthermore, this agent may also be able
to do the same for Checkers, Monopoly, Chess, and some
other board games. This agent would be able, for example by
clustering in the space of game strategies, to distinguish these
different games. In consequence, it can form the Category
of (those) Board Games. We ask whether such an agent also
have arrived at the concept of Board Games (assuming such
a concept exists)? The answer should in the first place be
“no”. At this stage, the agent merely possesses a collection of
exemplars representing the category. To form a Concept, the
agent would need to be able to extract the fact which strategies
are an essential ingredient of board games and are required to
achieve the goal of the game. Moreover, it would need to be
able to represent other essential characteristics of board games
such as that they are fundamentally 2D, the surface is always
divided into some segments, the pieces are moved horizontally,
etc., even if these were not recruited by the category-forming
clustering procedure.
In summary, the concept refers to an internal representation
which goes beyond the feature-based representation of a
category. To form a concept of a category an agent needs to
be able to extract the semantic essence of the category, and to
connect category and semiosis. At the same time, the concept
conversely needs to be able to infer categories from signs
or linguistic explanations. Concepts can be used to form yet
another, higher-level category, where concept formation could
then set in again. When we develop a cognitive system that
can form concepts, we can use not only probabilistic models,
but also neural networks. For example, a relational network
can infer grounded meaning in sentences by extracting some
conceptual structures without using discrete symbol structures
in their internal representations [120].
We believe that the distinction offered here between cate-
gory and concept captures many of the aspects of these two
entities discussed above. These definitions can be phrased in
computer (or network) terms which should be useful for our
purpose of helping to develop improved cognitive develop-
mental systems.
2) Feature representations: For performing recognition and
other tasks, a cognitive system needs to perform a hierarchical
feature extraction and obtain various feature representations.
Raw data, e.g., sound waves and images, do not represent a
category or a concept on their own. Let us consider image
classification as an example. From raw data, one can first
extract local low-level features (e.g., edges, textures, etc.).
Modern CNNs can automatically generate low-level features
represented by the activations of their lower layers, which,
however, are usually not human-understandable. Higher layers
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of a CNN will combine many low-level features of the
image, creating higher-level features. A CNN thereby creates
a feature hierarchy, and it has been demonstrated [78] that
some high-level features correspond to meaningful entities,
e.g., a human face or a human body. Thus, high-level features
represent more complex information than low-level features
or raw signals. However, it goes too far to assume that such
high-level features are categories or concepts, because so far
all of the above processes are strictly supervised and not
grounded in the perception of a cognitive agent. In addition,
there is no semiotic process present when such a feature
hierarchy is formed. Still, feature hierarchies are, as a result
of a data structuring process, a very useful front-end for
cognitions. Many studies on “symbolization” in previous AI-
related studies can be regarded as high-level (discrete) feature
representation learning. It is too naive to refer to simple
representation learning as symbol emergence.
3) Internal representation system: The term “internal repre-
sentation” has a very broad meaning. In a cognitive model, any
activation pattern of a neural network and any posterior prob-
ability distribution in a probabilistic model can be regarded as
an internal representation in a broad sense. Note that concepts
encoded in our brain system can be also regarded as internal
representations as well.
However, from the viewpoint of this review, we would
posit that the term internal representation system refers to a
structured system that is formed by interacting with symbol
systems in the society and somehow internalizing it. This
retains categories and concepts. It also retains knowledge of
syntax, semantics and pragmatics.
This is organized by multimodal perceptual information
obtained from its sensorimotor input and from the interac-
tion with the society in which the agent is embedded. As
discussed above, these bottom-up principles of organization
let an internal representation system emerge. Such an internal
representation system can be regarded as a PSS. Note that
the internal representation systems are never amodal symbol
systems.
4) Emergent symbol system: When we open a dictionary,
we can find many words representing concepts and categories
and their relationships. The meaning of each word is described
by some sentences, i.e., syntactically composed words. In
classical AI, they attempted to give a type of knowledge to
robots. That led to amodal symbol systems. We agree that this
type of “symbol system” does exist in society, but disagree that
we have such physical tokens in our cognitive system.
Through negotiation between cognitive agents, the standard
meanings of words and sentences are gradually organized
in a society or a community. Note that the symbol system
itself dynamically changes over time in a small community
and in the long term. However, it looks fixed in a larger
community and over the short term. Therefore, people tend
to misunderstand there is a rigid and fixed symbol system.
We argue that the symbol system in our society has an
emergent property. The symbol system is formed through
interaction between cognitive systems that have capability
of bottom-up formation of internal representation systems.
When the cognitive systems try to communicate with others,
they have to follow the symbol system. The symbol system
gives constraints to the agents’ symbolic communications. The
symbol system drifts over time. We call this structural abstract
entity an emergent symbol system to emphasize its emergent
property. Essentially, all symbol systems must be emergent
symbol systems.
5) Other related terms: In this section, we mention several
terms that also tend to be confused with symbols or symbol
systems, although they are clearly different.
Discrete state: As discussed above, symbols have strong
connections with categories and concepts. These are by con-
struction somehow discrete in the sense that every cate-
gory/concept has a boundary to other categories or con-
cepts. This definition goes beyond the token-like, more static
discreteness assumed by amodal symbol theories. The PSS
perspective, as adopted here, allows boundaries to move and be
vague. This tends to give people the misbelief that a discretized
state is a concept or a symbol, which is totally wrong.
Additionally, there are many studies that call discretization
symbolization. Symbolization may introduce some discrete
structure into the world because of its nature of categorization.
However, discretization alone cannot be regarded as symbol-
ization.
Word: A word is the smallest element that is written or
uttered in isolation with pragmatic and semantic content in
linguistics. It also becomes a syntactic element in a sentence,
and it consists of a sequence of phonemes or letters.
In an ASS (or even in formal logic), we tend to misunder-
stand this term to the degree that we would naively think that a
word, e.g., “apple,” itself conveys its own meaning. However,
as studies following the symbol grounding problem suggested,
to interpret the meaning of a word, the system needs to ground
the word by relating it, possibly via category and/or concept,
to its sensorimotor experience. Alternatively, the system could
also borrow meanings from other grounded words using syn-
tactic rules. These processes are called sensorimotor toil and
symbolic theft, respectively [76].
Moreover, the arbitrariness of labels and concepts suggested
in semiotics should be considered. The word representing
an apple, concept and category of the word “apple” can be
different in different languages and regional communities.
Note that a word is just an observed sign. It itself it is not
a concept or a category. Of course, it is not a symbol.
Language: Human beings are the only animals that can
use complex language, even though robots might be able
to use some type of reduced language in the near future.
Generally, symbol systems do not need to have all properties of
a language. Language involves syntax, semantics, pragmatics,
phonology, and morphology. Conventional formal logic has
regarded language as a formal system of signs governed by
syntactic rules for combining symbols, i.e., symbols in an
ASS, by extracting some logical part of language. The syntac-
tic characteristic is a crucial property of languages. However,
other aspects of languages are also important to develop a
robot that can communicate with people and collaborate in
a natural environment. To do this, the robot should have
cognitive capabilities allowing it to learn lexicons, semantics,
syntax, and pragmatics through sensorimotor interaction with
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its environment and other robots and humans. This is one of
the central challenges in cognitive developmental robotics.
VI. CHALLENGES
A. Computational models for symbol emergence and cognitive
architecture
Developing a computational model that realizes symbol
emergence in cognitive developmental systems is a crucial
challenge. Many types of cognitive architectures, e.g., ACT-R,
SOAR, and Clarion, have been proposed to give algorithmic
descriptions of phenomena in cognitive science [121], [122].
They described possible psychological process in interaction
between symbolic and sensorimotor computations. However,
their adaptability and developmental nature are limited. We
need a cognitive architecture that enables robots to automati-
cally learn behaviors and language from a sensorimotor system
to allow them to play the role of an agent in a symbol
emergence system.
Tani et al. have been studying computational models for
internal representation systems based on self-organization in
neuro-dynamic systems [91], [123]. Their pioneering studies
have shown that robots can form internal representations
through sensorimotor interaction with their environment and
linguistic interaction with human instructors. The central idea
is that continuous neural computation and predictive coding of
sensorimotor information is crucial for internal representation
formation. Recently, we can find many studies that apply
deep learning scheme to multimodal human-robot interaction
including linguistic modality [124]–[128]. Recent studies on
artificial general intelligence based on DRL follow a similar
idea. Hermann et al. showed that DRL architectures can
integrate visual, linguistic, and locational information and
perform appropriate actions by interpreting commands [109].
Taniguchi et al. have been using probabilistic generative
models (i.e., Bayesian models) as computational models of
cognitive systems for symbol emergence in robotics [5]. It is
occasionally argued that their models assume discrete symbol
systems in a similar way as ASSs. However, this involves
misunderstanding. A cognitive system designed by probabilis-
tic generative models has its internal states as continuous
probability distributions over discrete nodes in the same way
as a neural network has its state as activation patterns over
discrete nodes, i.e., neurons.
Neural networks can be trained using stochastic gradient
descent and related methods, i.e., backpropagation, and this
allows a system to have many types of network structure and
activation functions. Recently, neural networks with external
memory are gaining attention [129], [130]. Therefore, if we
have a large amount of data, a neural network can organize
feature representations adaptively through supervised learning.
This is an advantage of neural networks. However, in an
unsupervised learning setting, it is still hard to introduce a
specific structure in latent variables. In contrast, probabilistic
generative models can easily introduce structural assumptions
of latent variables, and are suitable for unsupervised learning.
Cognitive developmental systems should be essentially based
on unsupervised learning, because internal representations
should be self-organized through interactions in an unsuper-
vised manner. They have been making use of probabilistic
generative models and produced many unsupervised learning-
based cognitive developmental systems. However, at the same
time, the inference procedures of the models were not so
flexible compared to neural networks, i.e., backpropagation.
MCMC and variational inference, practically, tended to require
the use of conjugate prior distributions, e.g., Gauss–Wishart,
and Multinomial-Dirichlet distributions [82]. This has been
preventing their models from having feature representation
learning capabilities.
However, it should be emphasized that the employment of
probabilistic generative models or neural networks, e.g., neuro-
dynamics systems by Tani, is not a binary choice. For example,
Kingma et al. introduced autoencoding variational Bayes and
gave a clear relationship between variational inference in
probabilistic generative models and autoencoding using neural
networks [131]. They proposed variational autoencoder (VAE)
as an example of this idea. By integrating VAE and probabilis-
tic generative models, e.g., GMM and HMM, Johnson et al.
proposed a probabilistic generative model with VAEs as emis-
sion distributions [132]. Employing a neural network as a part
of the probabilistic generative model and as a part of inference
procedure, i.e., an inference network, is now broadening the
possibility of applications of probabilistic generative models
and neural networks. Edward, a probabilistic programming
environment developed by Tran et al. [133], has already been
merged into TensorFlow, which is the most popular deep
learning framework. Finding an appropriate way to integrate
probabilistic generative models and neuro-dynamics models
is crucial for developing computational cognitive architecture
modeling symbol emergence in cognitive developmental sys-
tems.
Artificial systems involving symbol emergence need to
have many cognitive components, e.g., visual and speech
recognition, motion planning, word discovery, speech syn-
thesis, and logical inference. All of those must be adaptive
and learn through interaction with the system’s environment
in a lifelong manner. In addition, when we develop such
cognitive components, we need to integrate them into a
conjoint architecture. After integration, the system should act
as a single, comprehensive learning system. Developing an
architecture that is decomposable and comprehensible while
providing consistent learning results is important. Nakamura
et al. introduced a framework called SERKET, which enable
us to develop cognitive components independently and allows
them to work and learn together in the same theoretical way,
as they are developed as a single learning system [134].
Computational models and frameworks to develop a large-
scale cognitive architecture that can work practically in the
real-world environment is our challenge.
B. Robotic planning with grounded symbols
Since the early days of AI, symbolic planning techniques
have been employed to allow agents to achieve complex tasks
in closed and deterministic worlds. As discussed previously,
one problem in applying such symbolic reasoning to robotics
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is symbol grounding [70], i.e., mapping symbols to syntactic
structures of concrete objects, paths, and events.
In robotics, this problem has been rephrased using the term
symbol anchoring, which puts stronger emphasis on the linking
of a symbol (in symbolic AI) to real-world representations
acquired with robot sensing [67], [135], [136]. This is a
particularly challenging task when the process takes place
over time in a dynamic environment. A number of works
in the literature have attempted to solve this problem by
relying on the concept of affordances [10], [137]–[140]: action
possibilities that are perceived in the objects. The perception
of object affordances relies on an action-centric representa-
tion of the object, which is dependent on the sensorimotor
abilities of the agent and that is learned from experience: if
a robot learns how to perceive affordances based on its own
visuomotor experience, it will then be able to attach action-
related symbolic information (e.g., afforded action, effects of
the action) to visual perceptions.
In the AI and robotics literature, comprehensive cognitive
architectures for representation, planning, and control in robots
have been proposed, involving multiple components address-
ing different requirements (e.g., sensor fusion, inference, exe-
cution monitoring, and manipulation under uncertainty). How-
ever, there is currently no single framework that is suited for all
applications given their great diversity [141]. Examples of such
comprehensive systems [142], [143], while presenting solid
theoretical foundations in behavior-based control and robot
simulation results, still lack robust and general applicability
(e.g., not being restricted to one specific task) on real robot
platforms, such as humanoids.
The above discussion shows that one major challenge arises
from having to design systems that can be scaled up to
complex problems, while all their components need to allow
for grounding. At the same time, such systems must cope with
the nasty contingencies and the noise of their real sensorimotor
world. Recently, hybrid approaches that combine strategies of
symbolic AI-based planning and perception- and behavior-
based robot control have been proposed to overcome the
main limitations of the two philosophies [144]–[149]: whereas
symbolic planning offers good generalization capabilities and
the possibility to scale, its static and deterministic set of rules
does not cope well with real uncertain environments where
robots operate. Conversely, tight perception–action loops that
allow robots to perform simple tasks effectively in the real
world do not scale to more complex problem solving.
From the viewpoint of symbol emergence system, action
planning capability and syntax should also be organized in
a bottom-up manner (Fig. 6). Structural bootstrapping had
been introduced as one possible model [150], in which the
structural similarity of a known to an unknown action is used
as a scaffold to make inferences of how to “do it with the
new one.” Additionally, syntactic bootstrapping also becomes
a key to accelerate learning action planning and language. If
the internal representation of planning and syntax are shared
in our cognitive system as shown in Fig. 6, it will accelerate,
i.e., bootstrap, syntax and planning capability learning.
This relates to learning hierarchies of action concepts as
well. When forming action concepts and symbols from senso-
rimotor experience, what should be their scale or granularity?
If internal representations are very fine-grained (bend a fin-
ger), they are easy for a robot to learn but hardly represent
useful cause–effect relations and are of limited use for action
planning. If they are very coarse-grained (build a tower), then
they represent powerful concepts but are very difficult to learn
from sensorimotor interaction. One way to obtain the best of
both worlds is to allow the agent to learn simple concepts
from sensorimotor experience, and then learn more complex
concepts on the basis of what it has already learned.
Ugur and Piater [107], [151] illustrated this principle in the
context of a robot that learns to build towers from experi-
ence by child-like play. The central idea behind this work
was to allow a robot to first (pre-trial) learn basic concepts
asking: “How will individual tower-building blocks respond
to actions?” In doing so, the robot was also categorizing
them by their properties discovered in this way. It could then
be shown that learning the stackability of building blocks is
clearly facilitated by using the category labels from the pre-
trials as additional input features. Similarly, generative models
can be beneficially used to learn and categorize actions in a
hierarchical way.
C. Language acquisition by a robot
Language acquisition is one of the biggest mysteries of the
human cognitive developmental process. Asada et al. described
how cognitive developmental robotics aims to provide new un-
derstanding of human high-level cognitive functions, and here
specifically, also the language faculty, developed by means of
a constructive approach that developmentally generates those
cognitive functions [6].
Along these lines, an integrative model that can simulta-
neously explain the process of language acquisition and the
use of the language obtained is still missing. To understand
the process of language acquisition, we need to develop a
computational model that can capture the dynamic process
of the language-learning capabilities, e.g., learning vocabu-
lary, constructing mutual belief, forming multimodal concepts,
learning syntax, and understanding metaphors. It appears that a
computational model based on machine learning could provide
a promising approach for understanding cognitive phenomena
related to language acquisition.
A series of non-developmental studies using deep and
recurrent neural networks made significant progress in speech
recognition and natural language processing, e.g., machine
translation, image captioning, word embedding, and visual
question answering, using a large amount of labeled data
to create off-the-shelf pattern processing systems. However,
this approach has, at least, two drawbacks. First, the ap-
proach is heavily based on manually labeled data or prepared
parallel corpora, e.g., transcribed speech data and a set of
pairs of English and Japanese texts. The learning process is
clearly different from that of human infants. Human infants
never have access to transcribed speech signals when they
acquire phonemes, words, and syntax. Human infants learn
language using their multimodal sensorimotor experiences.
Thus, current computational models that are based on su-
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pervised learning are basically not suitable for a construc-
tive model of human child cognitive development. Second,
semantic understanding of language by an AI system is
inevitably limited without a grounded internal representation
system (e.g., in terms of sensorimotor PSS). For further
improvement in the performance of translation, dialogue, and
language understanding, a computational model that includes
a comprehensive language-learning process will be required.
Recent advances in modern AI and robotics have brought
the possibility of creating embodied computational intelligence
that behaves adaptively in a real-world environment. Creating
a robot that can learn language from its own sensorimotor
experience alone is one of our challenges, which is an essential
element for the understanding of symbol emergence in cogni-
tive systems. Many studies have been exploring the challenge
in modeling language acquisition in developmental process
using neural networks [91], [124], [152] and probabilistic
models [5], [88], [153], [154].
There is quite lengthy list of subchallenges that have to
be addressed before we can reach this goal. The following
enumeration is incomplete.
1) A developmental robot should acquire phonemes and
words from speech signals directly without transcribed
data. Some attempts toward this exist. For example,
Taniguchi and coworkers proposed a hierarchical Dirich-
let process-based hidden language model, which is a
nonparametric Bayesian generative model, and showed
that the method lets a robot acquire words and phonemes
from speech signals alone. However, it still has many
restrictions [155], [156].
2) Learning the meaning of words and phrases based on
multimodal concept formation is another subchallenge.
The interplay between different modalities is crucially
important for this. For example, the learning process
of the meaning of a verb, e.g., “hit” or “throw,” must
depend on the learning process of the motion primi-
tives, action concepts, and perceptual outcomes of these
actions.
3) We also need a machine learning method for syntax
learning. Reliable unsupervised syntax learning meth-
ods are still missing. Many scientists believe that the
syntactic structure in action planning can be used for
bootstrapping language syntax learning.
4) Furthermore, we need unsupervised machine learning
methods for the estimation of speech acts and mean-
ing of function words, e.g., prepositions, determiners,
and pronouns, as well as metaphors without artificially
prepared labeled data.
5) The learning of nonlinguistic symbol systems that are
used with linguistic expressions, e.g., gestures, gaze, and
pointing, is also important. They might even have to be
learned as prerequisites of language learning [33].
All these subchallenges, in addition, need to deal with
the uncertainty and noise in speech signals and observed
(sensorimotor) events.
D. Human–robot communication, situated symbols, and mu-
tual beliefs
The existence of shared symbol systems is clearly fun-
damental in human–robot collaboration. Cognitive artificial
systems that incorporate the translation of natural-language
instructions into robot knowledge and actions have been
proposed in many studies. For example, the work by Tellex
et al. is geared toward interpreting language commands given
to mobile robots [157] and toward statistical symbol ground-
ing [158].
In order to support human activities in everyday life, robots
should adapt their behavior according to the situations, which
differ from user to user. In order to realize such adaptation,
these robots should have the ability to share experiences with
humans in the physical world. Moreover, this ability should
also be considered in terms of spoken language communi-
cation. The process of human language communication is
based on certain beliefs shared by those communicating with
each other [159]. From this viewpoint, language systems can
be considered as shared belief systems that include not only
linguistic but also nonlinguistic shared beliefs, where the latter
are used to convey meanings based on their relevance for the
linguistic beliefs.
However, the language models existing in robotics so far
are characterized by fixed linguistic knowledge and do not
make this possible [160]. In these methods, information is
represented and processed by symbols, the meaning of which
have been predefined by the robots’ developers. Therefore,
experiences shared by a user and a robot do not exist and can,
thus, neither be expressed nor interpreted. As a result, users
and robots fail to interact in a way that accurately reflects
human–human communication.
To overcome this problem and to achieve natural dialogue
between humans and robots, we should use methods that make
it possible for humans and robots to share symbols and beliefs
based on shared experiences. To form such shared beliefs, the
robot should possess a mechanism, related to mechanisms of
the theory of mind, that enables the human and the robot to
infer the state of each other’s beliefs, better allowing them to
coordinate their utterances and actions. Iwahashi et al. [161],
[162] presented a language acquisition method that begins to
allow such inference and makes it possible for the human
and the robot to share at least some beliefs for multimodal
communication.
VII. CONCLUSION
AI, cognitive science, neuroscience, developmental psychol-
ogy, and machine learning have been discussing symbols in
different contexts, but usually sharing similar ideas to a certain
extent. However, these discussions in the different fields have
been causing various types of confusion. A central problem
here is still the mixing up of the aspect of symbol systems
in society with the aspect of a rather agent-centric, internal
representation-based symbol system. Here, we have tried to
point out the importance of symbol emergence in cognitive
developmental systems by the interaction of both aspects.
Another aspect that we deem important is that symbol emer-
gence should be posed as a multifaceted problem that should
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take different sources of information for learning and different
points for exploitation into account. To help in this process,
we tried to more clearly define and reformulate different terms
from the perspective of (artificial) developmental cognitive
systems. This may, thus, represent a biased view, but we think
that it might benefit our field.
Machine learning-based AI, including deep learning, has
recently been considered as a central topic in the AI com-
munity. In this context, it is often said that the notion of
a “symbol system” is out of date. However, the “symbol
system” refers to symbolic AI, and not a symbol system in
our society. We humans still uses symbols, e.g., language,
to think and communicate. Learning and using symbols is
still a challenge in AI studies. To go further, we needed
to disentangle the two different notions of symbols: symbol
systems in symbolic AI and those in our human society. The
symbol emergence problem is not about symbolic AI, but
rather about cognitive developmental systems dealing with
(emergent) symbol systems in our human society.
Clearly, studying the interaction between language and
internal representations in the context of the more fluent, dy-
namic, and possibly more brain-like PSS is not out of date. We
also believe that symbol emergence is not an auxiliary prob-
lem in cognitive developmental science, including cognitive
developmental robotics and AI, but central to understanding
and developing natural and artificial cognitive systems. Thus,
studying symbol emergence in natural and artificial cognitive
systems, and tackling the problems described in Section VI
remain essential future challenges.
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